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A System of Emission Rights Auction 
With Revenue Plowback 
 
Lok Sang Ho1 
 
Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that “grandfathering” of pollution rights 
may be inefficient when existing polluters enjoy market power or 
when there are increasing returns to abatement efforts.  On the other 
hand an “auction and refund” approach, by effectively charging 
producers for the pollution they cause and refunding them in 
proportion to the value of their economic output levels, will result in 
greater efficiency and equity.  Moreover, this will resolve the possible 
complaint that a revenue-raising auction constitutes a “taking” of 
private property, and will address the worry that emission rights 
auctions may lead to higher electricity prices.  It is argued that thin 
trading of emission rights need not undermine the value of the 
emission rights auction. 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of emission trading has had a long history, dating back to the 
mid 1970s, when the US Environmental Protection Agency 
experimented with the idea of requiring any increase in pollution from 
an existing or new source to be offset by emission reductions from 
other sources.  Notwithstanding obvious theoretical advantages in 
                                                 
1  I thank Robert Main, Warwick McKibbin, Yew-Kwang Ng, and Jeremy Schreifels 
for comments and suggestions and Daniel Yuen for research assistance.  This research 
is funded by an internal grant at Lingnan University. 
 Correspondence address: Director, Centre for Public Policy Studies, Lingnan 
University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. Email: Lsho@Ln.edu.hk, Fax: (852) 28917940, 
Phone: (852) 26167178. 
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such an arrangement, a recent study found such programs in the 
United States “have generally failed to generate considerable trades.”  
“[R]etrospective reviews have tended to blame their shortcomings on 
high transaction costs, uncertainty and risk in obtaining government 
approvals, as well as lack of clear legal authority and clearly specified 
objectives.” (Environmental Law Institute, 2001, [6]).   The relative 
low volume of trades, however, does not in itself indicate that the 
marketization of pollution rights has “failed” as an instrument of 
public policy.  As this paper argues, by auctioning pollution rights 
and refunding the revenue to polluters (after subtracting 
administrative and monitoring costs) in direct proportion to their 
output (economic output, not pollution) levels, the system will 
enhance efficiency and will generate huge economic benefits even in 
the absence of active trading among the polluters, because it allocates 
the pollution rights efficiently and encourages polluters to maximize 
the value of output per unit of pollution. 
As pointed out by the EPA document (US Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2003, [11] p.2-6), in situations where greater environmental 
certainty is needed, cap and trade programs are preferable to emission 
charges or taxes because the cap sets an emission goal that pollution 
sources must meet.  In principle, an annual emission cap can be set 
for a country, for a region, or even for the world as a whole.2  The 
cap effectively generates a “quota” that can be distributed to existing 
or potential polluters within the region, the country, or the world, as 
the case may be.  Nordhaus and Boyer [10] used the term “where 
efficiency” to refer to the efficient allocation of pollution over 
space—within a country, across a region, or over the globe, and the 
term “when efficiency” to refer to the efficient inter-temporal 
                                                 
2  Asheim, et.al. (2006[1]) demonstrated that regional agreements often dominate 
global agreements for environmental preservation and may serve as a supplement, if not 
an alternative, for global ones. 
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allocation of pollution.  Setting a cap on pollution over a defined 
space and adjusting it over time can potentially bring about both kinds 
of efficiency. 
Traditionally it is believed that the initial allocation of the quota 
among polluters only has distributional consequences but not 
efficiency consequences.  The distribution may be done 
administratively based on some stipulated criteria. Alternatively the 
distribution may be done through an auction mechanism.  The 
political nature of the initial allocation is underscored by the fact that 
administrative distribution amounts to creating winners and losers 
(EPA, 2003, [11] p.3-14) by decree.  On the other hand auctions, 
through treating all producers new and old as equals, are clearly fairer 
and more neutral, but they are regarded as a tax on the industry and so 
could constitute a case of “taking of private property.” 
As pointed out by the EPA document, distribution of the quota is 
always a difficult issue.  Burtraw et. al. (2001, [3]) examined three 
alternative approaches to initial allocation.  One is a revenue-raising 
auction. The second is “grandfathering,” which would allocate 
allowances on the basis of historic generation.  The third is a 
“generation performance standard,” which would update allowance 
allocations based on shares of current electricity generation.3  As 
expected, they found the auction to be “dramatically more 
cost-effective than the other approaches”, but consumers would face 
the highest electricity charges.  “The generation performance 
standard (GPS) leads to the lowest electricity price and consumers are 
best off under the generation performance standard when examining 
                                                 
3  For example, as Beamon et.al. [3] explained: “if the national cap on CO2 
emissions were set at 1.914 billion tons (the 1990 CO2 emission level for the electricity 
sector) and the total generation from all plants covered under the cap equaled 4 billion 
megawatthours in a particular year, the GPS would equal 0.479 tons CO2 (0.119 metric 
tons carbon equivalent) per megawatthour generated.”(p. 2) 
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just electricity price changes.” This result is clearly related to the fact 
that the revenue-raising auction represents a tax on the power 
generation industry.  In contrast, “The allocation of allowances 
[under the generation performance standard] at zero cost represents a 
cost saving relative to AU (Auction) that is similar to GF (Grand 
Fathering). However, under GPS the allowances are allocated on the 
basis of generation, so firms are forced to compete for allowances by 
increasing generation at the margin. The subsidy implicit in the 
allowance allocation is netted against marginal cost, causing 
electricity prices and producer surplus to fall in competitive regions.” 
(p.22) 
In this paper, I shall demonstrate that the auction approach does not 
have to involve revenue generation, as is assumed by Burtraw et. al. 
(2001 [3]).  For the purpose of this paper and for simplicity I shall 
assume that polluters are all power companies.  Their economic 
output is electricity.  It is proposed that any funds raised through the 
auction net of administrative expenses be refunded to producers in the 
industry in proportion to the power generated.   This approach will 
be seen as fairer, as favoritism cannot come into play.  It will also 
end up reducing cost to consumers without compromising the 
effectiveness of the emission control.   
In Section 2 I shall show that the assignment of pollution rights is not 
efficiency-neutral. I shall demonstrate that under the “grandfathering” 
of initial rights, even when open market trading of these rights in the 
subsequent periods is permitted, power generation is likely to be 
inefficient when the recipient enjoys monopoly power or when 
pollution abatement is subject to increasing returns the degree of 
which varies from producer to producer.  Section 3 goes on to 
elaborate on a proposal of an auction combined with a refund policy 
and will demonstrate how it works.  Section 4 will explain the 
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rationale of the refund policy.  Finally Section 5 will draw the 
conclusions. 
 
2.  Grand Fathering May be Inefficient 
2.1  The Static Consideration 
Traditionally, analysts think of emission rights trading as involving (1) 
allocating rights among existing polluters in the first place, and (2) 
setting up a mechanism to allow free trading of these rights thereafter.  
As mentioned above, Stage (1) is often presumed to entail only 
distributional consequences, so that regardless of how the pollution 
rights are distributed in the first instance, trading among polluters will 
see to it that the rights will go to whoever can utilize them most 
efficiently, thus resulting in efficiency. 
This line of thinking is problematic for two reasons.  First, the initial 
allocation of the pollution rights may prevent the potential polluters 
from enjoying and acquiring the economies of scale to compete. 
Those with the larger allocation are more likely to survive, even 
though they may not be efficient producers, while potential 
competitors may not be given any chance to compete at all.  This has 
to do with dynamic efficiency.  This point will be elaborated below. 
Second is a static consideration that applies when the existing polluter 
wields monopoly power and is assigned pollution rights.  Although 
in the absence of monopoly power a producer may be in his own self 
interest to sell these rights to others if the value is higher to others 
than to himself, if it wields monopoly power it may act like a 
profit-maximizing monopolist and may prefer to restrict the supply of 
pollution rights in an attempt to achieve the maximum revenue. 
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Note: MC is rising because as more is released to the market retained rights 
become fewer and more valuable. The opportunity cost of releasing the rights is 
the value of these rights to the original recipient.    
 
In Figure 1, polluter M is assumed to be given free allocation of all 
the pollution rights.  Suppose MC depicts the marginal cost of 
selling the pollution rights. The rising MC indicates that the more he 
gives up the rights the greater will be the opportunity cost, which is 
simply the value of using the rights himself.  We have drawn MC as 
lying below D, which is the marginal social benefit of using the rights 
when all the quota is used up.  Thus M is an inefficient polluter.  
MR=MC results in his profit maximizing sales Q*, with a profit 
maximizing price P, which his competitors have to pay.  The polluter 
captures, in addition to PQ*, also the value under the MC curve from 
Q* to Q as it utilizes the retained quota Q-Q*. 
In the example potential competitors are far more efficient but have 
no rights while the pre-existing polluter enjoys free rights.  If the 
P 
MR of Selling 
the Rights 
Figure 1: Traditional 
System: Polluter M 
sells Q* units and 
keeps Q-Q*  
Q Units of Pollution Rights Assigned Gratis 
Market Demand for Pollution Rights 
MC of Selling 
The Rights 
Pollution Rights 
D 
Q*  Q 
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assigned rights are permanent, any improvement in productivity 
among new competitors, such as signaled by an upward shift in the 
demand curve (Market Demand for Pollution Rights), would further 
give the initial polluter a bigger capital gain as the pollution rights 
fetch a higher market price.  This cannot be justified because it 
represents a growing economic rent arbitrarily distributed to the initial 
polluter, who does not have to improve its productivity at all, but 
captures much of the benefits of the productivity gains achieved by 
others. 
2.2  The Dynamic Consideration 
The dynamic consideration refers to the fact that pollution reducing 
technology may be subject to economies of scale or increasing returns, 
and that even if new competitors are potentially more efficient they 
will be cost-disadvantaged if existing firms enjoy free pollution rights 
while they have to purchase.  We will assume that the price of 
pollution rights is not subject to the influence of any second-hand 
supplier.  For example, the price of pollution rights may be 
determined in the regional or the world market. 
Consider that a power plant has the following production function: 
 Q(KQ, LQ) (1) 
where KQ and LQ represent capital and labor devoted to power 
generation. 
Environmental damage is assumed to be a function of output and 
abatement inputs: 
 D(Q, KA, LA) (2) 
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where KA and LA represent respectively the capital and labor used in 
the abatement of the pollution.  D1 > 0, D2< 0, D3 < 0.  Increasing 
returns to abatement implies D22< 0, D33 < 0 
For power companies that enjoy a quota D which is the pollution 
entitlement for which no charge is applicable, his total profit function 
is: 
 PQ Q(KQ, LQ, D) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) – PD( D – D) (3) 
 if D is bigger than D. 
In this case the power company j will need to buy additional pollution 
rights from the market, and their abatement spending offsets the cost 
of the pollution rights at the margin: 
 
A
AA
DK K
LKQDPP ∂
∂−= ),,(   , and  
 A
AA
DL L
LKQDPP ∂
∂−= ),,(
 (4) 
The profit function is equal to  
 PQ Q(KQ, LQ, D) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) + PD( D – D)  (5) 
 if D is smaller than D  
In this case the power company j will have pollution rights to sell to 
the market.  Abatement allows the companies to spare rights that can 
be sold at a price.  The first order marginal conditions (4) still apply 
and will not change.  Total pollution from this power company D* = 
D*(Q*, KA*, LA*) where Q*, KA*, LA* are all solved from the first 
order maximization conditions. 
For power companies that do not enjoy any quota, the profit function 
is: 
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 PQ Q(KQ, LQ) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) – PDD (6) 
Now suppose a potential competitor i has a more efficient production 
function, so that pollution is smaller per unit of output, with the 
environmental damage function being: 
 D(aQ, KA, LA) ,    where a < 1 so that j
j
i
i
Q
D
a
Q
D
∂
∂=∂
∂
 (7) 
Moreover, under increasing returns to abatement, 02
2
〈∂
∂
AK
D .   
Although i could well replace j and would produce more output 
with the same pollution level, the “grandfathering” awards j with the 
free pollution quotas, rendering j profitable but i unprofitable.  With 
the need to pay for all of its pollution i’s marginal cost is higher and 
will fail to generate sufficient electricity for it to benefit from the 
economies of scale.  The marginal cost of i can be obtained by 
differentiating: 
 PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) + PD.D (8) 
with respect to Q, which is equal to: 
 Q
DP
Q
D
D
LP
Q
D
D
KP
L
L
P
Q
K
P DALAK
Q
L
Q
K ∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂
   (9) 
Although j’s marginal cost would comprise similar terms, being the 
first derivative of the following expression with respect to Q: 
 PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) + PD.(D-D)  (10a) or 
 PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) - PD.(D-D) (10b) 
by virtue of the fact of increasing returns that it enjoys, one key 
component of the marginal cost, 
Q
DPD ∂
∂ , may be lower for j than for i.  
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Total cost (10a) or (10b) is also much lower than total cost for i, 
which is equation (8) for the same output, implying that average cost 
for j will be much lower than that for i. 
 
3. The Proposal 
Now consider the following proposal.  Every year the government 
auctions an amount D  and all polluters have to compete for these 
rights equally.  All polluters, potential as well as existing, can 
compete for these rights in the open bidding process.  The 
equilibrium price will make sure that ∑ = DD .  Now it may be 
complained that some of the polluters, who had never been asked to 
pay any pollution tax or to buy any pollution right, are now asked to 
pay.  The suddenly imposed cost may pose difficulties for them and 
they may not have the resources to address the problem.  Ideally, the 
charges are recycled to support the investment to abate or to reward 
abatement already implemented.  To address this complaint, I 
propose that the polluters be refunded the net revenues from running 
this system: i.e., after deducting any necessary administration or 
monitoring charges (=C), the amounts collected be all refunded, on a 
pro rata basis in proportion to the values of outputs (Table 1).  
Under this arrangement, those firms who have invested in reducing 
pollution and who enjoy a high “output value: pollution ratio”, will 
collect an amount that may even exceed the amount paid to buy the 
pollution rights.  On the other hand, firms that are inefficient, those 
who produce small output but large pollution, those who have never 
invested to reduce pollution, will be penalized the most.  All firms 
will have the incentive to increase efficiency, and all investments, 
regardless of timing, that reduce pollution are rewarded as long as 
they are effective. 
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In principle the refunds should be based on the values of approved 
outputs.  That would take care of situations in which different kinds 
of outputs are involved.  It is possible that different kinds of outputs 
may be causing the same pollution that requires the specified rights.  
It will then not be possible to calculate the entitlements to refunds, if 
physical output units are used.  Moreover, efficiency is in principle 
higher if polluters produce higher value outputs than if they produce 
lower value outputs, given the same pollution levels generated.  
However, there may be a potential problem if the prices of outputs are 
regulated prices rather than market prices, in which case imputed 
output prices may be more appropriate.  The reason why the word 
“approved” is added is that we should not rule out the possibility that 
an original polluter is so successful that all pollution is eliminated.  
Approved outputs refer to outputs that are known to require a 
pollution-generating production process unless special investment is 
made to eliminate or to reduce the pollution.  In the event that 
pollution becomes zero the original polluter may not need to buy any 
pollution rights at all.  Yet he as a potential polluter should still be 
entitled to the refund as a reward for the pollution- eliminating 
investment that was made.  
Table 1: Pollution Rights Bidding and Refund System 
 Pollution Level Output Level 
(in $ of approved 
output) 
Net Cost of 
Pollution Rights 
After Refund 
Polluter 1 D1 Q1 PDD1 – RQ1 
Polluter 2 D2 Q2 PDD2 – RQ2 
Polluter 3 D3 Q3 PDD3 – RQ3 
Revenue 
collected/refunded 
∑DPD  Collected ∑QR  Refunded ∑DPD  - ∑QR  
Notes:  PD is determined in the market through competitive bidding or auction of 
∑= DD  rights.  R is the refund per unit of output determined by 
∑∑ − QCDPD /)(  where C is the administrative and monitoring cost. 
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Within the year, any pollution rights that are found to have been 
purchased in excess can be resold in the open market.  However, 
unused pollution rights at the end of the year will expire.4  Thus no 
one will be able to capture the economic rent associated with the 
increasing scarcity value of the rights over time. 
 
4. The Need to Plough Back Collected Revenue 
The proposal to return all the revenue raised through the auction to 
the producers in proportion to the values of their outputs may be 
discomforting to those who look at the prices paid for the pollution 
rights as simply reflecting a cost that is inflicted on society.  
Ultimately, it is argued, the consumers of the products whose 
production involves some damage to the environment may need to 
pay for the cost of that damage.  But prices are useful only as long as 
they guide resource allocation.  If resource allocation is already 
optimal—and we are assuming that science has already established 
the optimal amount of pollution reduction and we are already 
implementing effectively the annual pollution quota—there will be no 
additional gains for raising prices higher than what is necessary for 
these purposes.  In a world with two goods A and B and a single 
input, suppose optimal resource allocation is 1/3 of the resource for 
the production of A and 2/3 for the production of B.  If production is 
efficient, and the resource allocation is optimal, then the equilibrium 
market prices consistent with this equilibrium must be optimal prices.  
The fact that the production of A causes pollution will not change the 
                                                 
4  McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002[8], 2003[9]) propose two kinds of pollution 
permits, one with an expiry date and one without in their “Blueprint”.  The 
“Blueprint” is attractive in being flexible: the perpetual permits could be traded among 
firms, or bought and retired by environmental groups.  Governments, too, could buy 
back permits in future years if new evidence on climate change indicates that emissions 
should be cut more sharply.  But rents would accrue to parties that may not be seen as 
deserving. 
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fact that these are optimal prices—so long as the optimal resource 
allocation between A and B are in the ratio 1:2.  A revenue-raising 
auction gives the government or the auction administration resources 
to be spent at their will.  To the extent that this spending does not 
reflect the choices of individuals in the market place, this will lead to 
a deadweight loss. 
The need to return any collected revenue to the industry is not only 
based on efficiency grounds but also on legal grounds.  As Ellerman 
(1998 [5]) pointed out, auctioning the permits implicitly assumes that 
“the government owns the rights that are to be auctioned.”  Since 
“these incipient rights are possessed de facto by existing emitters and 
exercised by them” “the auction is not just a tax in disguise, but 
anticipatory confiscation of rights being established by time-hallowed 
use.” (pp.2-4) Returning the revenue collected to the industry deals 
with this issue of the legitimacy of the implicit tax. 
As was pointed out by Burtraw et. al. (2001[3], 2005[4]), under a 
revenue-raising auction the price of electricity generated will be 
higher than under revenue-neutral options, such as grandfathering or 
the generation performance standard.  By itself, the fact that prices 
rise above what is necessary to bring pollution in line with what is 
considered optimal implies that efficiency is affected.  In general, it 
will reduce profitability and reduce investment in power generation.  
But the pollution level is the same as under auction-with-plowback, 
less electricity will be generated at a higher price.  Pollution per unit 
of power generated will actually be higher.  
For simplicity let us assume that there are two industries X and Y.  If 
there are no externality effects, optimal allocation of investment 
between the two industries is achieved when: 
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Y
Y
X
X
K
PV
K
PV
∂
∂=∂
∂    (11) 
where PV represents the present value of the net income stream from 
each industry.  If industry X produces an environmental damage, the 
present value of the cost of this damage should be netted out PVX , so 
that  
 Y
Y
X
XX
K
PV
K
PVCPV
∂
∂=∂
−∂ )(
 (12) 
This condition would be achieved if external costs are fully priced.  
In that case any profit arising in a period would reflect the value of 
output minus all factor costs minus all pollution costs.  As long as 
pollution is fully priced both output level and the choice of 
technology will be optimal. 
An important question is exactly what fully pricing pollution mean?  
Since real prices are relative prices, the idea of fully pricing pollution 
is so that the technology of production is optimal and that the level of 
production of the outputs is optimal.  As long as the socially optimal 
amount of emission rights are auctioned off and put into the most 
socially profitable use there is no need to further tax investment in 
power generation, which is what a revenue-raising auction amounts to.  
By plowing back the revenue to power companies in proportion to the 
power generated, we reward firms for choosing an efficient 
technology and avoid taxing them on top of requiring the emissions to 
fall back to the optimal level.   
Effectively, under this system, the firm j’s profit function becomes: 
jDAjQjLAjQjKQjQjj
D
Q DPLLPKKPLKQQ
CDP
P −+−+−−+ ∑
∑ )()(),()(
  (13) 
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The first order conditions for profit maximization are obtained by 
maximizing with respect to KQ, LQ, KA, LA.  The existence of the 
refund motivates the firm to enhance its production efficiency. 
0)( =∂
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∂−+=∂
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In deriving these first order conditions, it is noted that since the total 
quota is fixed, one firm’s increase in pollution will not increase the 
funds available for redistribution and will only affect how the total 
amount is shared.  As a result all derivatives of ∑
∑ −
Q
CDPD   with 
respect to KQj, LQj, KAj, and LAj vanish to zero.  Moreover, since the 
first order conditions from differentiating with respect to LQj and LAj 
are direct mirrors of equations (14) and (15) they need not be repeated.  
From equation (14), we can see that the refund per unit of output 
increases the attractiveness of boosting production.  Moreover, (14) 
tells us that capital should be utilized until the marginal social benefit 
of the capital is equal to the price of capital, and ∑
∑ −
Q
CDPD  is as 
much part of the benefit of the marginal output as 
j
j
D Q
D
P ∂
∂  is an 
external cost when output-augmenting capital is put into production.  
In equation (15), capital for pollution abatement is utilized until the 
price of capital is equal to the savings from the reduction in the need 
for pollution rights.   
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There is a further point regarding the subtraction from auction 
proceeds before refund.  While it was stated that auction proceeds 
minus administration and monitoring costs are refunded to power 
generation firms in proportion to the values of their outputs, 
“administrative and monitoring cost” is actually a variable that may 
affect outcomes.  An emission rights market requires enforcement, 
and enforcement effort can be made bigger or smaller.  
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006[7]) showed that the 
emission levels of firms will vary with the monitoring or auditing 
effort.  Accordingly, as long as the marginal benefit in terms of this 
effectiveness is bigger than the marginal opportunity cost of the 
revenue, money should be deducted from the revenue raised to 
enhance the enforcement effort before the leftover is distributed. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The proposed system of openly auctioning yearly pollution rights 
assumes that we know how much pollution in total should be allowed.  
We may not have very accurate information on this, but any system of 
environmental management will have to either assume that we have 
the right target quantity of pollution (in which case the price of 
pollution rights is endogenous) or that we have the right price of 
pollution rights (in which case the amount of pollution resulting 
becomes endogenous).  Once we have made this assumption, the 
proposed system will allow us to hit the target in the aggregate among 
the relevant jurisdictions and allocate the emission rights fairly and 
efficiently among existing and potential polluters. Pollution rights are 
not assigned according to historical pollution levels and have to be 
acquired on the same terms by all existing and potential polluters 
through an open auction.  The collected revenues, after deducting 
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administrative and monitoring costs 5 , are recycled to provide 
incentives and financing for polluters to clean up and to improve 
efficiency.  Because the “refund” is in proportion to the value of 
pollution-generating output firms that produce the greatest value for 
any given pollution are rewarded, while those that produce high 
pollution but little value are punished.  Existing polluters will not be 
rewarded by large assignment of free pollution rights.  Because 
pollution rights are defined over a specific time period most of the 
rights purchased through this competitive bidding process are 
expected to be utilized.  Only the excess rights are resold and 
purchased by those firms that experience a shortfall.  As a result only 
minimal emission trading is expected.  Yet the system is efficient 
both because efficient firms are rewarded and because pollution rights 
are obtained by competition and not assigned by decree.  
                                                 
5  These expenses can be paid in the first place from the general revenue and then 
paid back later on after the revenue from emission rights auction has been collected. 
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